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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20040880-SC

vs.
RICHARD NORRIS,
Defendant/Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals from
its decision in State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732. The Supreme Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Is the Utah communications fraud statute overbroad under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution?
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of
the Utah Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196,1199 (Utah 1995). Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad is a question of
law reviewed for correctness. Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 5, 86 P.3d 735.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
§ 76-10-1801. Communications fraud-Elements—Penalties.
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions,
and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1)
shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the
offense described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing
of value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act
and offense of communication fraud.
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow,
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk
over; or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail,
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and
written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Defendant was charged with seven counts of communications fraud for selling
advertising to Utah sub-contractors through one Pennsylvania corporation, luring the subcontractors into default on their notes through a series of misrepresentations and omissions,
and then, through another Pennsylvania corporation, obtaining confession judgments in
Pennsylvania for much more than the originally agreed upon amount. Norris, 2004 UT App
267,at^[2;R. 1-8,106-12,125-27. The State twice amended the information and defendant
was tried for five counts of communications fraud. R. 210-14; 750-54. After the State rested
and in the midst of defendant's case-in-chief, defendant waived his trial rights and entered a
voluntary and unconditional guilty plea to three counts of communications fraud, all third
degree felonies. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, at % 2; See R. 761-72; R. 871-75. The court
sentenced defendant to three concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years, suspended the
same, and placed defendant on supervised probation. R. 791-93.
Defendant timely appealed, claiming that the communications fraud statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, at *f 2; R.
797-98. Although defendant had not challenged the constitutionality of the statute at trial,
had not moved to withdraw his guilty plea, and had entered an unconditional guilty plea, the
1

The facts underlying defendant's convictions are not relevant to resolution of the
questions presented for certiorari review. The State does not, therefore, provide a detailed
statement of those facts. Suffice it to say that defendant created three Pennsylvania
corporations through which he defrauded R&R Drywall, Durham Plumbing, and Foote
Insurance of money by means of false or fraudulent pretences, representations, promises, or
material omissions made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for
the truth. See R. 771 (Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea).
3

court of appeals addressed the merits of defendant's claim. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, at 12.
The court held that "a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute... is necessarily a
jurisdictional matter" that may not be waived by an unconditional guilty plea. Id. at ^f 7.
After so holding, the court "conclude[d] that the communications fraud statute is neither
unconstitutionally overbroad, nor unconstitutionally vague," and affirmed defendant's
convictions. Id. at1]} 16.
Defendant petitioned for certiorari review of the holding that section 76-10-1801 is
neither facially overbroad, nor vague. The State petitioned for certiorari review of the
holding that a challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is jurisdictional. This Court
granted certiorari review "only as to the following issues":
1. Whether the Communications Fraud Statute, section 76-10-1801 of the
Utah Code, is unconstitutionally overbroad.
2. Whether an unconditional guilty plea waives a defendant's appellate
challenge to the facial constitutionality of the statute under which the
defendant was charged.
Order dated December 22, 2004.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly concluded that the communications fraud statute is not
overbroad. The statute prohibits fraud only where the defendant makes false representations
or material omissions intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The
United States Supreme Court has held that such communications enjoy no First Amendment
protection. Moreover, defendant lacks standing to challenge the "anything of value"
provision as overbroad because he was convicted of obtaining "money" through fraudulent
means. In any event, the "anything of value" provision is not overbroad.
Defendant's vagueness claim should not be addressed by this Court. The Court did
not grant certiorari on this issue and it is not fairly included in the question of overbreadth.
ARGUMENT
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT OVERBROAD
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
After holding that it had jurisdiction to address defendant's claim,2 the Utah Court of
Appeals "conclude[d] that the communications fraud statute is not overbroad on its face."
Norris, 2004 UT App 267,fflf7-11. The court observed that the statute does not prohibit all
falsehoods or material omissions, as argued by defendant, "only those where an individual
seeks 'to defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value.'"
Id. at 111 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999)). The court also noted that the

2

The State challenges this holding in its Brief of Cross-Petitioner, infra, at 18-31.
5

statute prohibits only those falsehoods or material omissions that are "'made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code
Ami. § 76-10-1801(7)). The Court observed that the statute thus "draws the distinction
between criminal and innocent behavior" with a mens rea consistent with the standard set
forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).
Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ^f 11. As such, the court concluded, section 76-10-1801 is not
substantially overbroad and should not be invalidated. Id.
The court's holding is correct.
A.

THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE.

As a general rule, "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may
not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally
to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767, 102
S.Ct. 3348,3360 (1982). However, this traditional rule of "standing" has been altered by the
U.S. Supreme Court "to permit—in the First Amendment area—'attacks on overly broad
statutes . .. .'" Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916 (1973)
(citation omitted). As recently explained by this Court, the First Amendment exception for
overly broad statutes "' gives a defendant standing to challenge a statute on behalf of others
not before the court even if the law could be constitutionally applied to the defendant.'"
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ^ 10, 86 P.3d 735 (quoting State v. Lopez, 935
P.2d 1259, 1263 n.2 (Utah App. 1997)).

6

The overbreadth doctrine stems from the concern that '"persons whose expression is
constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their right [to free speech] for
fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected
expression.9" Los Angeles Police Dep'tv. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38,
120 S.Ct. 483, 488 (1999) (citation omitted). "Because these individuals are never
prosecuted, the overbroad statute [would go] unchallenged." Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 11.
The overbreadth doctrine remedies this "chilling effect" on expression, permitting "a party
[to] challenge a statute on the basis that it criminalizes protected speech even though that
party's own conduct or speech is not constitutionally protected." Id.
On the other hand, the overbreadth doctrine does not give a defendant standing to
challenge a statute indiscriminately. As explained in Thompson, an overbreadth claimant
must satisfy the other requirements for standing. Id. at f 12. "To have standing in the
context of a facial overbreadth challenge, a party must still demonstrate its own cognizable
injury in fact." Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). That is, the party must
demonstrate that the portion of the statute challenged as unconstitutional was applied to him.
See id.
The overbreadth doctrine, therefore, cannot be properly relied upon to invalidate a
portion of a statute under which a defendant has not been charged or convicted: 'When a line
of excision is available, one standing within the zone which a truncated statute might reach
may be barred from setting up the statute's overbreadth as to others.'" Id. at ^f 13 (quoting
State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280,1284 (Utah 1983)) (other citations omitted). The defendant

7

"may only challenge multiple portions of a statute if invalidating each of the challenged
portions would be necessary to find that defendant's conduct fell outside the statute's
proscriptions." Id. at ^f 18. A defendant may not challenge "a statutory provision
unnecessary to the outcome of the case because it is one that the parties do not have standing
to litigate." itf. atf 13.
The overbreadth doctrine "is, manifestly, strong medicine" because it "totally
forbid[s]" enforcement of a law which otherwise targets "harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2916-17. As a result, it
"is not [employed] casually," United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 39, 120 S.Ct. at 489, but
"sparingly and only as a last resort," Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. at 2916. "The
scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most exceptions to established
principles, must be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial invalidation of a
statute is truly warranted." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. at 3361.
Because the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine, those who challenge a statute as
overbroad carry a "heavy burden." McConnell v. Federal Election Comm 'n, 540 U.S. 93,
207,124 S.Ct. 619, 697 (2003). To prevail, an overbreadth claimant must demonstrate that
"(1) the statute 'reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,' even if
the statute also has a legitimate application, and (2) the statute is not 'readily subject to a
narrowing construction.'" Thompson, 2004 UT 14, 11 (quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (1987), and State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1983)
(other citations omitted)).
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B.

APPLICATION OF OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE TO SECTION

76-104801.

Section 76-10-1801 provides:
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions,
and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of
[communications fraud].
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1). At the outset, therefore, section 76-10-1801 falls within
those statutes that prohibit "conduct—even if expressive—fall[ing] within the scope of
otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." See Broadrick,
413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917. Defendant recognizes as much, conceding that "the
government has a legitimate interest in deterring and prosecuting fraud." Pet. Brf. at 22.
"Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown
extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence,
justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute
against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe." Id. at 615, 93 S.Ct, at
2917-18. Such is the case with section 76-10-1801. Indeed, a review of the statute reveals
that there is no overbreadth.
1. The First Amendment Does Not Protect Falsehoods Made
Intentionally, Knowingly, or With Reckless Disregard for the Truth.
The paramount question here is whether the communications fraud statute can
"conceivably be applied" to prohibit constitutionally protected conduct or expression. See

9

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767, 102 S.Ct. at 3360. It cannot, for it prohibits only those falsehoods
or material omissions that are "made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). Such falsehoods enjoy no First
Amendment protection.
The First Amendment affords a measure of protection to "some" falsehoods in order
to provide the breathing space necessary for the exercise of fully protected speech, or
"speech that matters:' BE & K Construction Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 531, 122 S.Ct.
2390,2399 (2002) (quoting Gertzv. Robert Welsh, The.,418U.S. 323,341-42,94 S.Ct.2997
(1974)) (emphasis added in BE & K). Nevertheless, "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830 (1976).
As a result, certain classes of speech "ha[ve] never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem." Chaplinsky v. State ofNew Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766,769
(1942). Falsehoods uttered intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for their
truth fall within one of those unprotected classes. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216 (1964).
In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not
permit civil recovery for a defamatory falsehood unless "the [false] statement was made with
'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726. The court of appeals here
concluded that because the mens rea requirement for communications fraud is consistent

10

with that required under New York Times, the statute "cannot be said [to be] 'substantially
overbroad.'" Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f 11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S.Ct.
2502). Defendant challenges this conclusion, arguing that the New York Times mens rea
standard "is clearly limited to its civil context and has no bearing on the constitutionality of a
criminal statute that proscribes speech, including § 76-10-1801." Pet. Brf. at 20.
Defendant's argument is wrong.
In Garrison v. Louisiana—issued the same year as New York Times—the U.S
Supreme addressed whether the New York Times mens rea standard for civil libel cases also
applies in the criminal context. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67, 85 S.Ct. at 212. It concluded that
it does. Id. Garrison recognized that "even where [an] utterance is false, the great principles
of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching
adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless'' Id. at 73, 85 S.Ct. at 215
(emphasis added). The Court concluded that the reasons which led to the knowing or
reckless requirement in New York Times "apply with no less force merely because the
remedy is criminal." Id. at 74, 85 S.Ct. 215-16.

The Court thus held that "[t]he

constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel application of the same standard
to the criminal remedy." Id. at 74, 85 S.Ct. at 216.
Although Garrison involved a criminal libel statute, the Supreme Court's analysis
made clear that knowing or reckless falsehoods enjoy no First Amendment protection,
whatever the context. The Court recognized that an inaccurate but honest utterance
contributes to the "fruitful exercise of the right of free speech." Id. at 75, 85 S.Ct. at 216.
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On the other hand, calculated falsehoods "put a different cast on the constitutional question"
because such falsehoods are "at once at odds with the premises of democratic government
and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected."
Id. The Court thus concluded that "[calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances
which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.'" Id. (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572,62 S.Ct. at
769). "Hence," the Court held, "the knowingly false statement and the false statement made
with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection" Id. (emphasis
added).
Garrison is controlling. As observed by the Court of Appeals, Norris, 2004 UT App
267, If 11, the communications fraud statute imposes criminal sanctions only where the
falsehoods are made "intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7).

Garrison held that such speech enjoys no First

Amendment protections. Accordingly, and regardless of any additional element that may
define or limit the offense, "it cannot be said that [the communications statute] is
'substantially overbroad' . . . ." Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ^ 11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at
458, 107 S.Ct. 2502).
2. The "Anything of Value" Provision Does Not Render the
Communications Fraud Statute Overbroad.
Relying on Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919), defendant
nevertheless claims that the communications fraud statute is overbroad because it requires no
12

"clear and present danger" or "harm." Pet. Brf. at 20-30. Specifically, he argues that
because the object of the fraud can be "anything of value," the "spectrum of constitutionally
protected communications . . . is only as broad as the imagination" and thus encompasses
fraudulent schemes that create no clear and present danger or harm. Pet. Brf. at 30. He
argues, for example, that the statute prohibits a knowing or reckless falsehood made to
preserve a good grade, Pet. Brf. at 18 (by claiming that "[t]he dog ate my homework"), to
receive a kiss, Pet. Brf. at 18, (by saying, "You don't look fat in that dress"), to avoid an
unwanted outcome, Pet. Brf. at 18-19 (e.g., an arrest), to obtain votes, Pet. Brf. at 28-29 (by
misrepresenting position on abortion), or to create a public controversy, Pet. Brf. at 28-29 (as
in an editorial). This claim fails on several levels.
(a) The Principle That Intentional, Knowing, and Reckless Falsehoods
Are Not Protected Is Dispositive.
As noted, falsehoods made intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly are not protected,
whatever the object of the fraud. It is therefore irrelevant how the statute limits the object of
the fraud. Whether or not the object of the fraud is a kiss, a vote, avoiding arrest, or some
other thing of arguable value is irrelevant because, in any case, the intentional, knowing, or
reckless falsehood is not protected. Defendant's challenge to the "anything of value"
provision thus fails.
(b) In Any Event, Defendant Does Not Have Standing to Challenge the
"Anything of Value" Provision Because He Was Not Convicted of
that Provision.
In any event, defendant does not have standing to challenge the "anything of value"
provision of the statute. Defendant pled guilty to three counts of communications fraud
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based on evidence at the trial establishing that he executed a fraudulent scheme to obtain
money, in excess of an originally agreed amount, from R&R Drywall, Durham Plumbing,
and Foote Insurance. See R. 771, 768. Accordingly, defendant was convicted under the
provision of the statute sanctioning a fraudulent scheme "to obtain from another money," not
"anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). As explained by this Court in
Thompson, a defendant does not have standing to challenge a provision of the statute which
was not applied to the defendant. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, YH12-13,18. This Court should
not therefore address defendant's challenge to the "anything of value" provision.
(c) In Any Event, the State May Prohibit Frauds Aimed at Depriving
Persons of Intangible Rights or Interests.
Even if this Court were to address defendant's claim, it fails on the merits for two
reasons.
First, defendant's reliance on Schenk and its progeny, including Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494,71 S.Ct. 857 (1951), is misplaced. The "clear and present danger" test
articulated in Schenck and Dennis has evolved into the Brandenburg "incitement" test.3
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm, Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 778, 116 S.Ct. 2374
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring)); United States v. Vieflaaus, 168 F.3d 392, 397 n.3 (10th Cir.
1999). And that test only applies to laws that forbid the advocacy of violence or the

3

Under the rule articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct.
1827,1830 (1969) (per curiam), "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action."
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violation of law. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S at 447, 89 S.Ct. at 1830; United States v.
Dinwiddle, 16 F.3d 913, 922 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996). The communications fraud statute is not
such a law.
Second, defendant's claim that the crime of fraud must be limited to money or
property is not supported by case law. "[T]he common law criminalized frauds beyond those
involving 'tangible rights' and 'the crime of fraud has often included deceptive seduction,
although that crime often includes no property or monetary loss.'" McNally v. United States,
483 U.S. 350, 371, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 2887-88 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that "[fraudulent misrepresentations can be prohibited" and
that penal laws can be enacted "to punish such conduct directly." Village ofSchaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, AAA U.S. 620, 637, 100 S.Ct. 826, 836 (1980). This
power is not limited to those frauds involving money or property.
In McNally, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the federal mail fraud statute was
limited to those frauds aimed at causing deprivation of property or money; it did not include
fraudulent schemes designed to deprive persons of intangible rights or interests, as in the
right to have public officials perform their duties honestly. Id. at 358-60,107 S.Ct. at 288182. This conclusion, however, was based on the Court's reading of the statute, not on any
constitutional limitation. Indeed, the Court invited Congress to amend the law if it wished to
expand mail fraud to those schemes involving intangible rights or interests. Id. at 360,107
S.Ct. at 2882 (acknowledging that "[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more
clearly than it has" in the current statute). Congress did so the following year. 18 U.S.C.
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1346 (1988) (providing that "the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services").
C.

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE STATUTE IS VAGUE IS OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF THE COURT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI.

Defendant also contends that the communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally
vague. Pet. Brf. at 31-39. The State does not address this claim because the Court did not
grant certiorari on this issue.
The law is well-settled that this Court will review on certiorari"' [o]nly the questions
set forth in the petition or fairly included therein' and for which certiorari is granted." DeBry
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). Although
defendant petitioned for review of the holdings on both vagueness and overbreadth, this
Court did not grant certiorari on the vagueness issue. See Order dated December 22, 2004
(granting defendant's petition for certiorari "only as to . . . [wjhether the Communications
Fraud Statute, section 76-10-1801 of the Utah Code, is unconstitutionally overbroad").
Defendant is thus precluded from raising vagueness on certiorari.
Moreover, vagueness is not fairly included in the issue of overbreadth. "While
admittedly vagueness and overbreadth are related constitutional concepts, they are separate
and distinct doctrines, subject in application to different standards and intended to achieve
different purposes." United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1070 (4th Cir. 1988). The
overbreadth doctrine is a First Amendment exception to the traditional rule of standing,
permitting a defendant to challenge a statute that infringes on First Amendment freedoms
"'even if the law could be constitutionally applied to the defendant.'" Provo City Corp. v.
16

Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ^ 10, 86 P.3d 735 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259,
1263 n. 2 (Utah App. 1997)). On the other hand, "'vagueness questions are essentially
procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute adequately notices the proscribed
conduct.'55 State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, % 43, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Morrison, 2001
UT 73, Tj 13,31 P.3d 547). Thus, while statutes are frequently challenged as both overbroad
and vague, the issue of vagueness is not fairly included within the issue of overbreadth.4
This Court should not, therefore, address defendant's vagueness claim because it is
outside the scope of certiorari—the Court did not grant certiorari on defendant's vagueness
claim and vagueness is not fairly included in the question of overbreadth.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
judgment of the court of appeals on the issue of constitutional overbreadth.

4

In any event, there is nothing vague about the terms "communicate," "artifice," or
"anything of value." Each term has a commonly understood meaning. Moreover, the fact
that they may encompass a wide range of activity does not render them vague. See State v.
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (holding that "a statute is not unconstitutionally
vague because it is broad").
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE5
Is a challenge to the constitutionality of a presumptively valid statute a jurisdictional
matter that may not be waived by an unconditional guilty plea?
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of
the Utah Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1199. "In
doing so, th[e] Court adopts the same standard of review used by the court of appeals:
questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are
reversed only if clearly erroneous." Id. "The determination of whether a court has subject
matter jurisdiction is a question of law" reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v. Quest,
Inc., 2001 UT 81, *{ 8, 31 P.3d 1147.

5

For a Statement of Jurisdiction, Statement of the Case, and relevant Constitutional
Provisions. Statutes, and Rules, see Brief of Respondent, supra, at 1-5.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals incorrectly concluded that a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute is a jurisdictional matter that cannot be waived by a guilty plea.
A court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case if it is one of the types of cases the court
has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute. The district court has original
jurisdiction of criminal cases.
communications fraud.

Section 76-10-1801 makes it a crime to commit

The statute is presumptively valid; no court has deemed it

unconstitutional. Accordingly, a case brought by the State charging defendant with violating
the communications fraud statute is a case the district court has been empowered to entertain.
The cases cited by the court of appeals do not support its holding. Moreover, a rule that
permits a challenge to the facial constitutionality of a statute notwithstanding a guilty plea
disrupts the finality of a judgment. Where defendant could make that claim in a pre-trial
motion, he should be required to do so.
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ARGUMENT
A CHALLENGE TO THE FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A
STATUTE IS A NONJURISDICTIONAL MATTER THAT IS WAIVED
UPON AN UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA
The majority of the court of appeals held that "an unconditional guilty plea does not
operate as a waiver of a facial constitutional challenge to a statute, because such a challenge
is jurisdictional in nature." State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, % 7, 97 P.3d 732. This Court
should reverse.
"The general rule applicable in criminal cases, and the cases are legion, is that by
pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the
crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea
constitutional violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989). On the other
hand, "challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be
waived." Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243,248 (Utah 1993). The question before the
Court here is whether the constitutionality of a statute goes to the subject matter jurisdiction
of the district court. It does not. Therefore, defendant waived that claim.
"'A court has subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the
court has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court
derives its authority.5" Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, f 16, 94 P.3d 211 (quoting In re Estate
of McLaughlin, 754 P.2d 679, 682 (Utah App. 1988)). In other words, "[sjubject matter
jurisdiction ... goes to the competence of a body to resolve a certain dispute." Castle Valley
Special Service District v. Utah Board of Oil, 938 P.2d 248, 254 (Utah 1996) (emphasis
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added). A challenge to a court's subject matter jurisdiction is a "challenge [to] the authority
of the court to hear the underlying case." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 38, 100 P.3d 1177.
The district court had the authority to hear the State's criminal case against defendant.
District court jurisdiction is defined by section 78-3-4 of the Utah Code: "The district
court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (West 2004). The
import of this language is clear: the district court has jurisdiction over proceedings against a
person who has been charged with a crime unless some other provision prohibits such
jurisdiction. See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, ^j 7, 63 P.3d 66 (holding that the import of
section 78-3-4 "is clear; specifically, the district court has jurisdiction over proceedings
against a person twenty-one years of age or older who has been charged with crimes he
allegedly committed when he was under eighteen years of age, unless some other provision
prohibits such jurisdiction").
Section 76-10-1801 makes it a felony crime to commit communications fraud. See
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1999). Accordingly, a criminal case charging defendant with
communications fraud "'is one of the type of cases the [district] court has been empowered
to entertain'" by section 78-3-4. Myers, 2004 UT 31, H 16 (quotingMcLaughlin, 754 P.2d at
682). Whether or not section 76-10-1801 is subsequently found unconstitutional, a case
charging a person with violating that section is a criminal case, which the district court "'has
been empowered to entertain.'"

Id. No other provision prohibits such jurisdiction.
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Accordingly, the majority below erred in concluding that a challenge to the constitutionality
of section 76-10-1801 goes to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction.
This Court has treated challenges to the constitutionality of a statute as
nonjurisdictional, finding them waived if not raised in the trial court below.
In Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211, the defendant entered an unconditional
guilty plea to one count of aggravated murder for the stabbing death of his former girlfriend
and her unborn child. Id. at \ 6. Myers did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, nor did he
seek a direct appeal. Id. In a petition for post-conviction relief, he claimed that the
aggravated murder statute was either insufficiently clear or wholly unconstitutional. Id. at ^j
14. Although his claim was raised at trial and thus procedurally barred under the PostConviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002), Myers contended that he
was not barred from raising his claim in a post-conviction proceeding because "the alleged
defects in the aggravated murder statute divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the
matter." Id. at ^[ 15. Myers argued that "because the aggravated murder statute is either
insufficiently clear under [State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978)], or wholly
unconstitutionalunder [Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S.Ct. 705 (1973)], the statute cannot
be the basis for criminalizing the killing of a nonviable fetus." Id. (emphasis added).
This Court rejected Myers's jurisdictional claim. The Court observed that"' [a] court
has subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the court has been
empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court derives its
authority.'" Id. at \ 16 (quoting McLaughlin, 754 P.2d at 681-82) (citing Restatement
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(Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982)). The Court also acknowledged that jurisdictional claims
may not be waived. Id. However, the Court concluded that Myers had "failed to state any
legitimate jurisdictional defect" because as a "criminal case/' the aggravated murder
prosecution was "certainly the type of case over which the trial court generally has
jurisdiction." Id. The Court so concluded notwithstanding Myers' claim that the statute was
"wholly unconstitutional" under Roe.
In State v. Hodges, the State charged the twenty-one-year-old defendant in district
court with six first degree felony crimes for sexually abusing a child when Hodges was under
eighteen. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, \ 2. Hodges argued that Utah law vested jurisdiction with
the juvenile court in such cases, not the district court. Id. at ^f 4. Alternatively, Hodges
argued that if Utah statutes vest jurisdiction with the district court, "then the statutory
scheme is unconstitutional" under both the Utah Constitution and the United States
Constitution. Id. at ^j 5. The Court rejected Hodge's first argument, concluding that the
district court had jurisdiction over his case under Utah's statutory scheme. Id. atffl[7-16.
Although Hodges claimed that the statutory scheme, as interpreted by the Court, was
unconstitutional, the Court refused to address the claim because Hodges did not raise it
below.
[Hodges] raises his constitutional arguments for the first time on appeal. "The
general rule is that issues not raised [in the district court] cannot be argued for
the first time on appeal, and this rule applies to constitutional questions."
Because defendant has not asserted either of the exceptions to the general
rule—plain error or exceptional circumstances—we decline to address
defendant's constitutional issues.
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Id. at 15 (quoting State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994) (other internal citations
omitted)) (brackets supplied in Hodges). In other words, the Court did not treat his claim
that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional as jurisdictional in nature. Accordingly,
Hodges waived the claim when he failed to raise it in the trial court.
This Court should follow the precedent set in Myers and Hodges.
The majority cites Blackledge v. Perry, All U.S. 21,30-31,94 S.Ct. 2098 (1974), and
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2, 96 S.Ct. 241 (1975), in support of its holding that
the facial constitutionality of a statute is jurisdictional in nature. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,
Tf 6. Blackledge and Menna do not support the majority's holding.
In Blackledge, the defendant (Perry) was tried and convicted of misdemeanor assault
in connection with an altercation with a fellow inmate. Blackledge, All U.S. at 22,94 S.Ct.
at 2099. When Perry appealed, giving him a right to a trial de novo, the prosecution obtained
a felony indictment from a grand jury based on the same conduct for which Perry had been
convicted on the misdemeanor charge. Id. at 22-23, 94 S.Ct. at 2100. Perry pled guilty and
was sentenced to prison. Id. Perry thereafter filed a federal habeas petition seeking reversal
of his felony conviction. Id. at 23, 94 S.Ct. at 2100.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court recognized that Perry's guilty plea
normally would preclude him from raising a constitutional challenge on federal habeas. Id.
at 29-30, 94 S.Ct. at 2103. The Court observed, however, that the Due Process Clause
"preclude[s]" a state from responding to a defendant's invocation of his statutory right to
appeal "by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to [completion of the appeal]."
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Id. at 28-30,94 S.Ct. at 2103-04. The Court held that because such vindictive prosecutions
go "to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge
brought against him/9 the defendant could challenge it for the first time on federal habeas.
Id. at 30-32, 94 S.Ct. at 2103-04. In other words, the State "simply could not permissibly
require Perry to answer to the felony charge." Id. at 31, 94 S.Ct. at 2104.
In Menna, the defendant was held in contempt and sentenced to 30 days in jail for
refusing to testify before a grand jury. Menna, 423 U.S. at 61,96 S.Ct. at 241. Menna was
subsequently indicted on a criminal charge for refusing to answer questions before the grand
jury and he pled guilty. Id. Menna appealed, "claiming that the Double Jeopardy Clause
precluded the State from hailing him into court on the charge to which he had pleaded
guilty." Id. at 242, 96 S.Ct. at 242. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[w]here the
State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a
charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the
conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty." Id. (quoting Blackledge, 417
U.S. at 30, 94 S.Ct. at 2103).
In sum, Blackledge and Menna address "the very power of the State to bring the
defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him." Blackledge, 417 U. S. at 3 0,
94 S.Ct. at 2103. In each case, the Constitution "preclude[s]" the State from "hal[ing a
defendant] into court at all upon [a] felony charge." Id. at 30, 94 S.Ct. at 2104; Menna, 423
U.S. at 62, 96 S.Ct. at 242; accord United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 109 S.Ct 757
(1989).
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While double jeopardy and due process precludes a State from twice haling a
defendant into court on the same charges, nothing in the Constitution precludes the State in
the first instance from haling a defendant into court for violating a law duly enacted by the
Legislature. As recently observed by this Court, and echoed in Judge Bench's dissent,
"[sjtatutes are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown." Jones v.
Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, ^ 10, 94 P.3d 283; accord Norris, 2004 UT App
267, f 27 (Bench, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones). The United States Supreme Court has
likewise recognized that "[a] statute is presumed constitutional." Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509
U.S 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993). "Thus, because the communications fraud
statute was not challenged below, it is presumed to be constitutional, and the district court
had jurisdiction." Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 27 (Bench, J., dissenting).6
As held by the U.S. Supreme Court in Broce, "[b]y entering a plea of guilty, the
accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is
admitting guilt ofa substantive crime" Broce, 488 U.S. at 570,109 S.Ct. at 762 (emphasis
added). In other words, he concedes the validity of the criminal statute.
Just last year, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the issue now before the court
and held that "a facial challenge to a presumptively valid criminal statute does not raise an
issue of subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal prosecution and thus may be waived if not

6

Of course, the outcome would be different if the State were to prosecute a defendant
for violating a law that had previously been invalidated as facially unconstitutional. In that
case, there would be no presumption of constitutionality and prosecution of the invalidated
law would then be "prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1).
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timely asserted." State v. Thomas, 685 N.W.2d 69, 84 (Neb. 2004). In so holding, the
Nebraska court relied on the rationale of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 879,
117 S.Ct. 204 (1996). This Court should follow suit.
In Baucum, the D.C. Circuit held that "facial constitutional challenges to
presumptively valid statutes [are] nonjurisdictional" and thus can be waived. Id. at 540. The
court held that "[w]hen a federal court exercises its power under a presumptively valid
federal statute, it acts within its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 3231" (granting
federal district courts original jurisdiction of all offenses against federal laws). Id. The court
acknowledged that "once a statute has been declared unconstitutional, the federal courts
thereafter have no jurisdiction over alleged violations (since there is no valid 'law of the
United States' to enforce)... ."Id. at 540-41. However, the court emphasized that "a belated
assertion of a constitutional defect does not work to divest that court of its original
jurisdiction to try [a defendant] for a violation of the law at issue." Id. at 541.
The majority's opinion in this case is premised on a theory that if a criminal statute is
deemed unconstitutional, it is void and any action taken pursuant to that statute is invalid.
See Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 7. Baucum, however, rejected such a "broad-sweeping
proposition." Baucum, 80 F.3d at 541. Baucum observed that in Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317 (1940), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that "a district court enjoyed res judicata effect even after the jurisdictional statute
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under which the court had acted was subsequently declared unconstitutional." Baucum, 80
F.3d at 341. In Chicot, the Supreme Court stated:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording
no basis for the challenged decree. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past camiot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.
Chicot, 308 S.Ct. at 374,60 S.Ct. at 318 (citations omitted); accord Baucum, 80 F.3d at 541
(quoting the foregoing passage). Accordingly, the actual existence of a presumptively valid
statute, prior to any determination finding otherwise, is an operative fact which the district
court has power to entertain.
Baucum also rejected the proposition "that the Blackledge/Menna exception to the
general rule of waiver is about subject matter jurisdiction, since the [U.S. Supreme] Court
has since clarified that a double jeopardy claim can, under certain circumstances, be waived
voluntarily." Id. at 543 (emphasis in original) (citing Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,9-10,
107 S.Ct. 2680, 2685-86 (1987)). Baucum concluded that even if Blackledge and Menna
address subject matter jurisdiction, "it does not follow that any facial constitutional challenge
is also jurisdictional." Id. As explained above, such challenges are not jurisdictional.
Finally, Baucum noted an "important prudential consideration[ ] that militate[s] in
favor o f a conclusion that facial constitutional challenges be preserved or waived. Id. at
544. The court explained that if it "were ... to treat all facial constitutional challenges as
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jurisdictional, [it] would... invite' wait and see' tactics throughout the entire duration of the
criminal proceedings." Id. Some courts have not required preservation because "[l]ittle
purpose would be served by requiring a defendant to insist upon a trial in order to preserve
his opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the statute." Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d
864, 867 (1984). However, in Utah, such is not the case. "With approval of the court and
the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and
mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to
a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion." Utah R. Civ. P.
1 l(i). Defendants should not be permitted to plead guilty to a criminal offense, then after
sentencing, appeal on the ground that the substantive crime for which they admitted guilt
was unconstitutional. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 570, 109 S.Ct at 762
In support of its holding, the majority below also cites a number of federal circuits
that treat an unconstitutional statute as a jurisdictional defect Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 6,
(citing United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3rd Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S.
1065,123 S.Ct 2234 (2003); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975,978 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291, 1295 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hill, 564
F.2d 1179, 1180 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Morgan, 230
F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000); Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. PalaciosCasquete, 55 F.3d 557, 560-61 (11th Cir. 1995). These cases, however, are devoid of
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analysis, offering no rationale for their conclusion. Instead, they appear to be simple
applications of procedural rules of review. Such was clearly the case in the Second Circuit
Court's decision inMercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F,2d 666, 671-72 (2nd Cir. 1974) (reaching
the constitutional claim after concluding that under New York law, "no objection is required
to preserve for appellate review a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right").7
The majority also cites the Seventh Circuit. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 6 (citing
United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v Kenney, 91
F.3d 884, 885 n.l (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495,496-97 (7th Cir. 1995)).
In Bell, the Seventh Circuit considered an appeal challenging the constitutionality of a
statute, even though defendant had entered an unconditional guilty plea. Bell, 70 F.3d at
497. However, that decision suggested that it would not do so in every case. See id.; accord
Kenney, 91 F.3d at 885 n.l (observing that government expressly declined to raise a waiver
argument but describing Bell as holding that "challenge to constitutionality of statute of
conviction is, in certain circumstances, jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty plea")
(emphasis added).8

7

Morgan and Skinner cite Blackledge and Menna, but do not explain how Blackledge
and Menna compel the conclusion that a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a
jurisdictional defect that cannot be waived by a guilty plea. For the reasons explained above,
they do not.
8

The majority also cited the Tenth Circuit decision, United States v. Barboa, 111 F.2d
1420,1423 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985), in support of its holding. That decision, however, does not
support the court of appeals holding. Bar boa permitted a defendant to challenge his guilty
plea in a federal habeas proceeding based on a claim that thefacts alleged did not constitute a
crime. Barboa, 111 F.2d at 1423 n.3.
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In sum, a challenge to the facial constitutionality of a statute is nonjurisdictional.
Accordingly, an unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any such challenge on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the
judgment of the court of appeals holding that a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute is a jurisdictional matter that cannot be waived.
Respectfully submitted May 16, 2005.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

^ p F F R E Y S. GRAY
^-^Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent
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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme.
DAVIS, Judge:
%1 After entering an unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to
three counts of communications fraud, Richard Norris (Defendant)
challenges the constitutionality of the underlying statute (the
communications fraud statute) on appeal. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801 (2003).x We affirm.
BACKGROUND
1[2 Defendant was charged with seven counts of communications
fraud and was bound over on all counts. See Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1801 (2003). After several days of trial, Defendant entered
an unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three counts of thirddegree-felony communications fraud. See id. § 76-10-1801(1) (c) .
After sentencing, and without moving to withdraw his guilty
pleas, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, mounting a
1. Because the communications fraud statute has not changed
since Defendant was charged, we cite to the most current version
for convenience.

facial challenge to the constitutionality of the communications
fraud statute on overbreadth and vagueness grounds.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
H3
We consider two issues on appeal. First, we must determine
whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider
Defendant's constitutional challenge after Defendant entered an
unconditional, voluntary guilty plea. "The determination of
whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law, which we review for correctness . . . ." Beaver County v.
Qwest, Inc. , 2001 UT 81,1)8, 31 P.3d 1147. Second, if this court
has jurisdiction, then we must consider whether the
communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally overbroad or
vague on its face. "Constitutional challenges to statutes
present questions of law, which we review for correctness."
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,1(5, 86 P.3d 735. "When
addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute
is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality." State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24,1(6, 980 P.2d 191.
ANALYSIS
I.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1(4
"The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings . . .
is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have
admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and
thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged
pre-plea constitutional violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App
244,1Jl3, 54 P. 3d 645. The State asserts that Defendant's facial
challenge to the constitutionality of the communications fraud
statute falls within the ambit of the "pre-plea constitutional
violations" mentioned in Parsons. 781 P.2d at 1278. Therefore,
the State argues that because Defendant's challenge is
nonjurisdictional in nature, it was waived by his guilty plea.
Defendant asserts that "pre-plea constitutional violations," id.,
encompass violations involving such things as Miranda admonitions
and search warrants, and that a facial constitutional challenge
to a statute is, at its heart, a jurisdictional issue.
Therefore, Defendant argues that his challenge was not waived by
his guilty plea.
1|5
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the
the court to determine a controversy and
proceed." Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d
App. 1987) (per curiam). Subject matter
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power and authority of
without which it cannot
1230, 1232 (Utah Ct.
jurisdiction "can

neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused.
Objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter may be urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the
right to make such an objection is never waived." James v.
Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations and
citations omitted). When subject matter jurisdiction is an
issue, " [i]t is the duty of this court to 'satisfy itself not
only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts
in a cause under review.'" EEOC v. Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423,
1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237,
244 (1934)).2
1[6
"In general, a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional
defects, but does not bar appeal of claims that the applicable
statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to state
an offense." United States v. Broncheauf 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n.l
(9th Cir. 1979). "Although a guilty plea waives all
non[]jurisdictional defects and fact issues, a vagueness
challenge is a jurisdictional defect. Thus, following a guilty
plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he was prosecuted
under an unconstitutional statute." United States v. Skinner, 25
F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1994) (quotations and citation
omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per
curiam) ("We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does
not waive a claim that--judged on its face--the charge is one
which the State may not constitutionally prosecute."); Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did
not preclude the defendant from raising his constitutional claims
because they "went to the very power of the State to bring the
defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him");
2. Instead of focusing on whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists in a particular context, Judge Bench relies on Utah cases
generally describing jurisdiction of our courts of general
jurisdiction. The issue squarely presented in this case has not
been addressed by Utah courts.
Our jurisprudence, however, is no stranger to the concept
that a court with general jurisdiction over a particular claim
may or may not have subject matter jurisdiction over that claim.
Although not directly analogous to the case at bar, perhaps the
best example involves claims against governmental entities.
There is no question that courts of general jurisdiction in Utah
have jurisdiction over those claims. This notwithstanding,
however, Utah appellate decisions have repeatedly held that the
failure to strictly comply with the statutory requirements for
claims against governmental entities deprives those courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. See, e.g., Greene
v. Utah Transit Auth. , 2001 UT 109,^16-17, 37 P.3d 1156;
Security Inv. Ltd. v. Brown, 2002 UT App 131,1(13, 47 P.3d 97.

United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002)
(addressing defendant's claim that the underlying statute was
unconstitutional because it "properly f [e]11 within the narrow
scope of review not barred by a guilty plea"), cert, denied, 538
U.S. 1065 (2003); United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071
(8th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that a claim that a statute is
facially unconstitutional is a jurisdictional claim not waived by
a guilty plea); United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 816 (7th
Cir. 1996) (addressing defendant's argument on appeal after his
guilty plea because he made "the only argument available to him
by asserting a jurisdictional challenge based on the
constitutionality of the underlying statute"); United States v.
Kenney. 91 F.3d 884, 885 n.l (7th Cir. 1996) ("[The defendant]
entered his guilty plea without preserving his constitutional
challenge[ to the underlying statute] for appeal. However, the
government has expressly declined to raise a waiver argument,
citing United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1995)
(challenge to constitutionality of statute of conviction is, in
certain circumstances, jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty
plea)."); Bell, 70 F.3d at 496-97 (addressing defendant's
challenge to the constitutionality of the underlying statute
after recognizing the principle that such a challenge "is a
jurisdictional claim which is not waived by the guilty plea");
United States v. Palacios-Casguete, 55 F.3d 557, 561 (11th Cir.
1995) ("A guilty plea . . . does not waive the right of an
accused to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under
which he is convicted."); Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 552
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant "did not waive his
constitutional attack on the [underlying] statute by pleading
guilty"); United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that although the dividing line between
constitutional claims that are waived by a guilty plea and those
that survive the plea is not "crystal-clear," " [c]laims that 'the
applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment
fails to state an offense' are jurisdictional claims not waived
by the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262 n.l)),
amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Barboa,
777 F.2d 1420, 1423 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985) ("A plea of guilty . . .
does not bar a claim that the defendant may not constitutionally
be convicted in the first instance . . . .
If [the defendant]
pie[aded] guilty to something which was not a crime, he is not
now precluded from raising this jurisdictional defect, which goes
'to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court
to answer the charge brought against him.'" (quoting Blackledge,
417 U.S. at 30)); United States v. Hill, 564 F.2d 1179, 1180 (5th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (recognizing that "a guilty plea does not
bar an appeal that asserts that . . . the charge is
unconstitutional"); United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291, 1295
n.5 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that a claim based upon "the
unconstitutionality of the statute underlying the indictment" was
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an "appealable issue [] following a . . . guilty plea"); United
States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 978 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975)
(recognizing "that after entering . . . a plea of guilty, a
defendant may only appeal jurisdictional defects in the
proceeding below, such as . , . the unconstitutionality of the
statute underlying the indictment"); Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502
F.2d 666, 612 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[I]t is clear that [a] guilty plea
waives only nonjurisdictional defects and does not waive the
right to contest the constitutionality of the statute that is the
basis for a conviction." (second alteration in original)
(quotations and citation omitted)); United States v. Cox, 464
F.2d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1972) (recognizing that "[a] defendant
who has pleaded guilty is not barred from claiming . . . that the
statute under which he was charged is unconstitutional"
(quotations and citation omitted)); 1A Charles Alan Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 175 (3d ed. 1999)
("[T]he preclusive effects of guilty pleas do not apply to
constitutional claims that go 'to the very power of the State to
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought
against him.f A defendant who has pleaded guilty may still
contend . . . that the statute under which he was charged is
unconstitutional." (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30)
(footnotes omitted)).
f7
Because a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute directly cuts to "the power and authority of the court to
determine a controversy," Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232, it is
necessarily a jurisdictional matter. Accordingly, an
unconditional guilty plea does not operate as a waiver of a
facial constitutional challenge to a statute, because such a
challenge is jurisdictional in nature.3 Therefore, we address
3. The justice court appeal process analog in Judge Bench's
opinion is somewhat puzzling.
Since justice courts are not courts of record, traditional
appellate review is generally unavailable or severely limited.
This notwithstanding, the Utah Constitution guarantees "the right
to appeal in all [ criminal] cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
In City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990),
our supreme court ruled that the trial de novo appellate
procedure now set out in Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-120
(2002) satisfied this constitutional mandate. See Christensen,
788 P.2d at 518-19. Following a trial de novo, traditional
appeal therefrom is available only if "the district court rules
on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-5-120 (7) .
In our view, this unique process for obtaining review of
justice court proceedings has nothing to do with issue
(continued...)

Defendant's arguments.4
II.

Constitutional Challenge

^8
Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute is
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1801 (2003) . We consider each of his arguments in turn.
A.

Overbreadth

1[9
"In considering whether a statute [is overbroad], a court's
first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." In re
I .M.L. , 2002 UT 110,1115, 61 P.3d 1038 (quotations and citations
omitted). We examine "criminal statutes . . . with particular
care; those that make unlawful a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid
even if they also have legitimate application." Id. (quotations
and citations omitted). However, n[o]nly a statute that is
substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face." City of
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987). Overbreadth "must not
only be real, but substantial as well." Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535
U.S. 564, 584 (2002) (quotations and citation omitted).
3. (...continued)
preservation or waiver of nonjurisdictional constitutional claims
by voluntary guilty plea--section 78-5-120 makes no reference to
either. Indeed, if anything, it is a recognition of the
importance of claims involving the constitutionality of statutes
or ordinances, specifically contemplating such challenges in the
court of record in the first appeal. Under the statutory scheme,
raising the constitutional challenge to the statute or ordinance
is the method by which jurisdiction is conferred on appellate
courts to entertain further appeals, the defendant having already
been accorded his or her constitutional right of appeal from the
justice court by trial de novo in a court of record. This is a
far cry from the ability to challenge subject matter jurisdiction
in an initial appeal of right.
4. The State argues that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 498 Utah
Adv. Rep. 4, both addresses and disposes of the issues herein.
The appellant's claims in Myers were based upon the PostConviction Remedies Act, see id. at %10j and, to the extent the
appellant alluded to constitutional defects in a statute, his
challenge was not facial. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court
characterized his argument as based on an "allegedly incorrect
legal interpretation [of a rule of law]," and never addressed or
ruled upon the effect of a facial constitutional challenge. Id.
at 1l7.

UlO When interpreting the challenged language, "we look to the
statute's plain language and presume that the legislature used
each term advisedly." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at <fl6.
"Statutory language is overbroad if its language proscribes both
harmful and innocuous behavior." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935
P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and citations
omitted). The communications fraud statute prohibits
devis[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money,
property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material
omissions, and . . . communicat[ing] directly
or indirectly with any person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing
the scheme or artifice.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). Defendant posits that the
communications fraud statute is overbroad "because it permits
criminal prosecution and sanctions in every case involving a
communication [] that could be construed as dishonest."
Specifically, Defendant argues that the communications fraud
statute does not require an intent to defraud, and that it
criminalizes innocuous behavior because " [a]s long as there is an
artifice, a false communication in any form made for the purpose
of executing the artifice, and a desire to obtain anything of
value, the elements of the communications fraud statute are met."
Defendant also alleges that the modes of communications
prohibited in the communications fraud statute are similarly
overbroad and prohibit constitutionally protected conduct. See
id. § 76-10-1801(6). We disagree.
^11 First, the communications fraud statute does not prohibit
all false "pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions," only those where an individual seeks "to defraud
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of
value." Id. § 76-10-1801(1). Second, it requires proof that~the
false or fraudulent "pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the
truth." Id. § 76-10-1801(7). While the First Amendment may
value some falsehoods for their contribution to public debate,
see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19
(1964), it has not given protection to malicious statements that
were made "with knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless
disregard of whether [they were] false or not." Id. at 279-80.
The communications fraud statute draws the distinction between
criminal and innocent behavior with a similar mens rea, and thus,
it cannot be said that it is "substantially overbroad" and should
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be "invalidated on its face." Hill, 482 U.S. at 458.
Accordingly, we conclude that the communications fraud statute is
not overbroad on its face.
B.

Vagueness

Kl2 Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute is
unconstitutionally vague in its use of the terms "artifice,"
"communicate," and "anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-101801(1), (6)(a). "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that
a statute or ordinance define an offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations
and citations omitted). However, because the communications
fraud statute "implicates no constitutionally protected conduct,"
Defendant must show that it "is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications." Village of Hoffmann Estates v. Flipside, Hoffmann
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982).
%13 Defendant argues that the term "artifice," Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801(1), is defined too broadly and would encompass any
form of deceit so that ordinary persons would not know whether
the deceit was prohibited. While not defined in the
communications fraud statute, "artifice" is commonly understood
to mean "an artful stratagem," or a "trick." Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary 106 (9th ed. 1986). Black's Law Dictionary
defines "artifice" similarly as " [a] clever plan or idea,
esp[ecially] one intended to deceive." Black's Law Dictionary
108 (7th ed. 1999) . Additionally, we do not read the term
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), in a vacuum, but
rather as it relates to the other terms within the communications
fraud statute. See Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50,^8, 502 Utah
Adv. Rep. 12 (stating that " [s]ubsections of a statute should not
be construed in a vacuum but must be read as part of the statute
as a whole" (alteration in original) (quotations and citation
omitted)). Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the
communications fraud statute does not prohibit all artful
stratagems and tricks, only those meant to, inter alia, defraud
others. While the term "artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-101801(1), may be construed broadly, "a statute is not
unconstitutionally vague because it is broad." State v. Wareham,
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). We conclude that the term
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is used with
"sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at
1265 (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, we conclude
that the term "artifice," as used in the communications fraud
statute, is not unconstitutionally vague. Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1801(1).
?nri9na££-r<7\

fl4 Defendant next argues that the term "communicate," Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a), is vague because it is "given the
broadest possible definition" under the communications fraud
statute. The communications fraud statute prohibits
"communicat[ing] directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or
artifice." Id. § 76-10-1801(1). Additionally, it specifically
states that to communicate "means to bestow, convey, make known,
recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or
to transmit information." Id. § 76-10-1801(6) (a) . Defendant's
argument is unavailing. Although "communicate," Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801(6)(a), is broadly defined, this does not necessarily
make the term unconstitutionally vague. See Wareham, 772 P.2d at
966. Indeed, uhe communications fraud statute does not seek to
punish those who keep an artifice or scheme to themselves.
Defendant fails to demonstrate how "ordinary people can[not]
understand what conduct is prohibited," Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265
(quotations and citations omitted), and therefore, fails to
demonstrate that the term "communicate," as used in the
communications fraud statute, is unconstitutionally vague. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (6) (a) .
1|l5 Finally, Defendant argues that the phrase "anything of
value," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is unconstitutionally
vague because it is undefined and left open to a variety of
interpretations. Defendant proffers numerous hypothetical
situations in an attempt to illustrate the vagueness of the
phrase "anything of value." Id. However, "speculation about
possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before the
[c]ourt will not support a facial attack on a statute when it is
surely valid in the vast majority of its intended applications."
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) (quotations and
citation omitted). Defendant was charged under the
communications fraud statute because he devised a scheme to
defraud others of "money." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). We
believe that "the vast majority of [the communications fraud
statute's] intended applications," Colorado, 530 U.S. at 733
(quotations and citations omitted), will involve incidents where
individuals have defrauded others of "money" or "property," Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), both of which are terms that are
sufficiently understood to allow ordinary citizens to determine
what conduct is prohibited. See Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265.
Additionally, because Defendant was charged with devising a
scheme to defraud others of "money," Utah Code Ann. § 76-101801(1), his actions do not fall within the "anything of value"
realm, id., and thus, he may not challenge this phrase as
unconstitutionally vague. See Village of Hoffmann Estates, 455
U.S. at 495 n.7 ("One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies

may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." (quotations and
citation omitted)).
fl6 Defendant's constitutional challenge to the communications
fraud statute fails. We conclude that the communications fraud
statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad, nor
unconstitutionally vague.
CONCLUSION
1fl7 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is
jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, we conclude that
Defendant's facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute is not barred by his voluntary,
unconditional guilty plea. However, in considering Defendant's
facial challenge to the communications fraud statute on
overbreadth and vagueness grounds, we conclude that it is not
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Accordingly, we affirm
Defendant^s\ conviction.
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Davi

ORME, Judge (concurring):
i[l8 I concur in the court's opinion. I write separately to
explain my position, because I recognize the lead opinion
represents a departure from the general prohibition against
raising issues for the first time on appeal, especially in the
face of a guilty plea.
fl9 For me, the easy proposition is this: Subject matter
jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised by either party or
the court at any time. So far as I am aware, there is no
exception to this rule for guilty pleas. See James v. Galetka,
965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[Subject matter
jurisdiction] is derived from the law. It can neither be waived
nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be urged at
any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an

5. In his brief on appeal, Defendant states that "[a] rguably,
this is precisely the type of conduct the communications fraud
statute was intended to prohibit."
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objection is never waived.") (internal quotations & citation
omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
112 0 In this sense, the lead opinion's analogy to sovereign
immunity cases is actually pretty good. If a plaintiff sued the
State without giving the required presuit notice, and the State
did not raise the lack of notice as a defense below, it would
presumably not be permitted to raise the lack of notice for the
first time on appeal in challenging a judgment that had been
entered against it. However, if giving the presuit notice is
necessary to vest the court with subject matter jurisdiction,
then of course the lack of notice could be raised for the first
time on appeal. And indeed, giving presuit notice strictly in
compliance with the sovereign immunity statute has been held to
be a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.. Greene v.
Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,^16, 37 P.3d 1156.
1(21 While this kind of subject matter jurisdiction issue usually
arises in civil cases, the concept is the same in criminal cases.
If a guilty plea is entered, and no issues are reserved for
appeal consistent with State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), then unless the guilty plea is set aside as
involuntary, all issues are waived on appeal, except subject
matter jurisdiction, which can never be waived. See James, 965
P.2d at 570. Thus, if a 32-year-old defendant was charged with
murder in juvenile court and pled guilty, on appeal to this court
he most certainly could challenge the lack of the juvenile
court's subject matter jurisdiction over an adult charged with
murder, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, -105 (Supp. 2003)--even
if the guilty plea was otherwise proper and he never raised the
jurisdictional problem below. The same is true if a defendant
pled guilty to the "crime" of blasphemy, and no such criminal
offense were on the books in Utah. If he pled guilty, and did
not raise below the point that no such crime existed in Utah, he
still could challenge his conviction by raising, albeit for the
first time on appeal, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
And obviously he would succeed. The trial court simply would
lack the judicial power to convict the defendant of a nonexistent
crime.
i]22 Here is where it gets admittedly more tricky: Suppose our
criminal code made it a felony to commit the crime of blasphemy,
defined as "disparaging the one Almighty God or questioning His
existence." If a defendant pled guilty to that offense, did not
preserve a constitutional challenge for appeal under Sery, and
did not raise the constitutionality issue below, could he raise
for the first time on appeal the facial unconstitutionality,
under the First Amendment, of the statute criminalizing
blasphemy? At one level, it seems that charges brought pursuant

to such a statute would be just as much a nullity as charges
brought, as in the immediately preceding hypothetical, in the
complete absence of any blasphemy statute. In simplest terms, in
this country there simply could be no crime of blasphemy--any
statute purporting to provide otherwise would be facially
unconstitutional. But he could not raise this constitutional
challenge for the first time on appeal unless facial
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter jurisdiction.1 Does
it? I am not completely sure, although I can see that, in
concept, an unconstitutional statute is as ineffectual as no
statute.
112 3 This is what ultimately explains my vote in this case: No
Utah appellate court has squarely answered the question of
whether a challenge to a criminal statute based on facial
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter jurisdiction. The
lead opinion cites a multitude of cases that have held it does;
Judge Bench's opinion cites no^case that has addressed the
question and held it does not.2 It is admittedly somewhat

1. Judge Bench points out such an argument could be reached
under the plain error doctrine. Maybe. But the rescue
opportunity provided by the plain error doctrine is rather
limited. As hereafter shown, the ability to claim plain error
can itself be waived. In contrast, subject matter jurisdiction
can never be waived. In the blasphemy hypothetical, if facial
unconstitutionality is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction,
it could be addressed for the first time on appeal even if plain
error was not raised, see State v. All Real Property, 2 004 UT App
232,i|l3 n.7; was inadequately raised, see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (holding that if any of the
requirements for plain error are not met, "plain error is not
established" and cannot be raised); or was raised too late. See
Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,119, 17 P.3d 1122 (holding court
would not reach unpreserved issues under plain error doctrine
because plain error raised for first time in reply brief).
2. I disagree with Judge Bench's claim that Myers v. State, 2004
UT 31, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, considered this question and
rejected it on the merits. The Myers court described the
jurisdictional argument asserted in the case as being "somewhat
convoluted." Id. at ^15. Later, the Court characterized the
argument as being tantamount to a "claim[] that the trial court's
decision constituted an 'erroneous application of the law.'" Id.
at %11 (citation omitted). In any event, the Court's dismissal
of the jurisdictional argument in Myers was premised on the
simplistic notion that "'[a] court has subject matter
(continued...)
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counterintuitive for me that a substantive conclusion of
unconstitutionality--even facial unconstitutionality--defeats
subject matter jurisdiction, but that seems to be the prevailing
view. Accordingly, with some trepidation, I concur in the
court' s ojs

£l3?£gory K. Or me, Judge

2 . ( . . .continued)
jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the court
has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute
from which the court derives its authority,'" id. at ^16
(citation omitted)--an obvious overstatement as readily shown by
the sovereign immunity example, i.e., district courts have
general civil jurisdiction and even jurisdiction over disputes
against the State, but lack subject matter jurisdiction over such
a case if the presuit notice is flawed in some way. Another
example of the overbreadth of the pronouncement in Myers is the
fact that appellate courts have the constitutional and statutory
power to consider appeals, and yet are held to lack subject
matter jurisdiction over appeals that are untimely. See Utah
Const, art. VIII § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided
by statute . . . . " ) ; id. § 5 ("The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by
statute."); Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2002) (specifying Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction); id. § 78-2a-3(2) (specifying
appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals); Varian-Eimac, Inc.
v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[F]ailure
to file an appeal within the required time limit deprived the
court of subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing Watson v.
Anderson, 29 Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1973)).
The very best indication that the Myers court simply did not
have before it the issue we must decide--at least not in any kind
of cogent, well-developed way--is that the only authority cited
in Myers is two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals and the
statute giving the district courts original jurisdiction of "all
matters civil and criminal," subject to certain limitations.
Myers, 2003 UT 31 at Ul6 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1)
(2002)) . The Myers opinion did not acknowledge, much less did it
treat, the extensive state and federal jurisprudence categorizing
the facial unconstitutionality of a criminal statute as being a
matter of subject matter jurisdiction—a virtual impossibility if
the argument had actually been made and was well-supported, as in
the instant case.

BENCH, Judge (concurring in the result):
1J24 I do not necessarily disagree with the main opinion's
analysis of the constitutionality of the communications fraud
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). But, because
of the procedural posture of this case, I would rule that we
cannot reach the issue under controlling Utah law.1
^25 As recognized by the main opinion, Defendant entered an
unconditional guilty plea to three counts of communications
fraud. CJL. State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(allowing defendants to enter conditional pleas preserving the
right to appeal any specified pretrial ruling). In the district
court, Defendant never challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. Nor did he enter a conditional plea to preserve his
right to appeal the constitutionality of the communications fraud
statute. See id. Furthermore, Defendant never filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,^3, 40
P.3d 63 0 (requiring defendant to file a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea before
defendant can challenge the validity of the guilty plea on
appeal). Instead, Defendant filed a notice of appeal directly
from his sentence. Now, for the first time, Defendant attempts
to raise the issues of overbreadth and vagueness as
constitutional challenges to the communications fraud statute.
He claims he can do so because subject matter jurisdiction cannot
be waived and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
convict him of violating an unconstitutional statute.
^[26 This approach reflects a basic misunderstanding of
jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court recently explained subject
matter jurisdiction very succinctly as follows: "A court has
subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of
cases the court has been empowered to entertain by the
constitution or statute from which the court derives its
authority." Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31,1(16, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 4
(other quotations and citation omitted); see also Salt Lake City
v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) ("Subject matter

1. Given the clarity of the Utah law, decisions from the federal
courts are not helpful. Nor are the federal cases even
consistent with each other. See, e.g., United States v.
Montilia. 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989) amended by 907 F.2d
115 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The dividing line between the majority of
constitutional claims waived by a voluntary plea of guilty, and
those that challenge the right of the state to hale the defendant
into court, and thus survive the plea . . . , has not been
crystal-clear.").
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jurisdiction is 'the authority and competency of the court to
decide the case.'" (citations omitted)).
1(27 The main opinion contends that a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute is necessarily a jurisdictional
matter because the inherent constitutionality of a statute
affects whether a court has the power and authority to decide the
issue. However, without a proper challenge, courts must presume
the constitutionality of a statute.
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional
until the contrary is clearly shown. It is
only when statutes manifestly infringe upon
some constitutional provision that they can
be declared void. Every reasonable
presumption must be indulged in and every
reasonable doubt resolved in favor of
constitutionality.
Jones v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,1(10,
P.3d
(quotations and citations omitted). Thus, because the
communications fraud statute was not challenged below, it is
presumed to be constitutional, and the district court had
jurisdiction.
f28 In footnote two of the main opinion, my colleagues attempt
to find support for their extraordinary decision by pointing to
the distinction between general jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction. As noted by the main opinion, we do not focus "on
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in [this] particular
context" because, unlike claims made against governmental
entities--which require compliance with the Immunity Act--the
communications fraud statute at issue here requires that nothing
be done, by either party, before criminal defendants can be
prosecuted and courts can exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
With claims against a governmental entity, "the legislature has
explicitly declared how, what, when, and to whom a party must
direct and deliver a Notice in order to preserve his or her right
to maintain an action against a governmental entity." Greene v.
Utah Transit Auth. , 2001 UT 109,1115, 37 P.3d 1156. Thus,
11
[c] ompliance with the Immunity Act is necessary to confer
subject matter jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear claims
against governmental entities." Id. at 1[l6. In the instant
case, as with presumably every other criminal prosecution, the
charging statute does not explicitly declare what must be done
before subject matter jurisdiction is conferred. Thus, the
district court had general jurisdiction as well as subject matter

jurisdiction due to an absence of legislative requirements or
limitations.2
f29 Therefore, if Defendant wanted to challenge the
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute, he had to
do so first in the district court. See, e .cr. , State v. Pugmire,
898 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Although [defendant]

2. In an attempt to bolster the "main opinion's reasoning, the
concurring opinion discusses some rather bizarre hypotheticals.
First, the thirty-two-year-old defendant charged with murder in
juvenile court. Thankfully, this potential calamity has already
been resolved by our legislature. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a104, -105(1) (a) (2002) (detailing jurisdiction of juvenile
courts). By contrast, our legislature has not limited the
jurisdiction of district courts in a similar manner. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (2002) ("The district court has original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law."). Second, the
criminal defendant who pleads guilty to the nonexistent crime of
blasphemy. If no such crime of blasphemy existed, then we would
not indulge in the presumption that a nonexistent, unwritten
statute was constitutional. Here, however, a statute does exist,
and, until challenged, we must presume it to be constitutional.
Third, if a defendant pleaded guilty to the theoretical crime of
blasphemy, and did not preserve his constitutional challenge,
then he could raise the challenge for the first time on appeal by
arguing plain error. A plain error challenge could easily be
made without making the facial constitutionality of a statute a
prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction.
As for the concurring opinion's statement that " [n] o Utah
appellate court has squarely answered the question of whether a
challenge based on facial unconstitutionality goes to subject
matter jurisdiction," our supreme court has squarely addressed
the question. In Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 498 Utah Adv. Rep.
4, the Utah Supreme Court; explained that even when Myers argued,
for the first time on appeal, that the wholly and facially
unconstitutional aggravated murder statute divested the trial
court of jurisdiction, he had "failed to state any legitimate
jurisdictional defect" because "[t]he Utah Code provides that
'the district court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not
prohibited by law.'" Id. at 1lS (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-34(1)). The instant case is no different. Thus, even when Norris
argues, for the first time on appeal, that the communications
fraud statute is facially unconstitutional, and that such
unconstitutionality goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of
the district court, he fails "to state any legitimate
jurisdictional defect." Myers, 2004 UT 31 at Kl6.
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raises the issue on appeal, he did not challenge the
constitutionality of this statutory scheme before the trial
court. As a general rule, we will not consider issues--including
constitutional issues—initially raised on appeal."); State v.
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("As the Utah
appellate courts have reiterated many times, we generally will
not consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the
appellant raises on appeal for the first time.").
^[30 This rule applies with equal force to facial challenges to a
statute made for the first time on appeal. In State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), when a facial
challenge to a criminal statute was raised for the first time on
appeal, this court addressed Archambeaufs challenge only for the
"plain error" and "exceptional circumstances" arguments he made.
See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922, 926. Defendant, in the instant
appeal, asserts no claim of plain error or exceptional
circumstances.
^[31 Allowing defendants to raise constitutional challenges for
the first time on appeal will logically necessitate overruling a
large body of jurisdictional jurisprudence involving Utah's
justice courts. .See, e.g., City of Monticello v. Christensen,
788 P.2d 513, 517 (Utah 1990) ("[T]his Court [has] repeatedly
held that a person dissatisfied with a justice court decision
could appeal that decision to a district court and that the
district court decision was final unless the validity or
constitutionality of a statute was at issue, not on appeal, but
in the lower court."); Draper City v. Roper, 2 0 03 UT App 312,^2,
78 P.3d 631 (per curiam) ("'The decision of the district court
[from a hearing de novo following a justice court's ruling] is
final and may not be appealed unless the district court rules on
the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.'" (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7))); South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson,
2002 UT App 405,1(6, 61 P. 3d 282 ("Utah case law clearly provides
that neither this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from proceedings in the district
court held pursuant to an appeal from the justice court unless
the issues raised in the justice court involve [] the validity or
constitutionality of an ordinance or statute." (quotations and
citations omitted)); City of Kanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1068
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[H]istorically, Utah appellate courts have
never had jurisdiction to hear appeals of district court
decisions after a de novo trial on appeal from an unfavorable
justice court judgment, absent the raising of a constitutional
challenge in the justice court."). The practical consequence of
the main opinion is that defendants will now be allowed to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute in this court, for
the first time, without ever having bothered to raise the issue
in either justice or district court.

^|32 Having failed below to challenge the statute on grounds of
overbreadth and vagueness, and having failed on appeal to argue
either plain error or exceptional circumstances, Defendant is now
precluded from challenging the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute. I would therefore affirm based on
Defendant's failure to preserve his constitutional challenge.
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Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

